FIRST
DIVISION
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MELENCIO BERBOSO AND CONCEPCION
BERBOSO,
Petitioners, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BELEN
CARLOS, CORAZON CARLOS, AND JKM INTERNATIONAL,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 141593-94 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: July
12, 2006 |
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Before Us is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP No. 41568 and No. 42122 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 December 1996, which affirmed the 1 March 1996 Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5994 and the 25 June 1996 Decision and 16 September 1996 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board[2] (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 1283. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals directed the Register of Deeds, Meycauayan, Bulacan, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. EP-149-M and No. EP-150-M and to reinstate cancelled TCTs No. T-114000 (M), 120510 (M), 102513 (M), 120514 (M), 120516 (M), and 120517 (M) in the name of herein private respondent JKM INTERNATIONAL, INC. (JKM), as well as TCTs No. 122924 (M) and 122925 (M) in the name of Wong Lee Lee.
Culled from the records are the
following facts:
On 29 November 1973, herein private respondents Belen and Corazon Carlos, together with Manuel, Alberto, Antonio and Rafaelito, all surnamed Carlos, filed with the Bureau of Land Acquisition, Distribution and Development of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a joint request for the conversion of their parcel of land consisting of 48.2789 hectares of unirrigated riceland situated at Calvario, Iba, and Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and covered by TCTs No. 48182 and No. 48183 issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On
In view of the foregoing, and
considering the parcels of land subject hereof to be suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes as verified and recommended by
the Department of Local Government and Community Development and the Agrarian
Reform Team Leader concerned, the course and the parcels of land subject hereof
are hereby declared suitable for residential, commercial,, industrial and other
urban purposes subject however, to the provisions of Presidential Decree 406
and other Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instruction, Memoranda and General
Orders which may hereafter be promulgated as declared by the President in his
land policy speech.
It is understood further, that the possession of the agricultural
tenant-farmers concerned of their
respective landholdings shall not be disturbed until they are duly paid and
their landholdings shall already be developed for urban purposes whereby their
continuous possession thereof is no longer tenable.
Pursuant to the
On 1 September 1989, private respondents Carloses
filed with the DARAB Region III a Petition[4]
for Confirmation of the Order of Conversion and for the Determination of the
Amount of Disturbance Compensation docketed as DARAB Case No. 101-Bul ‘89. On 7 October 1989, private respondents Carloses and Emiliano Berboso, brother of herein petitioners Berbosos
and the named respondent in DARAB Case No. 101-Bul ‘89, filed with the DARAB a
Joint Motion[5] to
Determine the Amount of Disturbance Compensation due to the respondent/tenant
agreeing to abide with the decision of the Board. On
In
its Decision[6]
dated P112,644.00 equivalent to five years
disturbance compensation.
On
Private
respondents Carloses presented a photocopy of
Official Receipt No. 3312102[8]
dated P112,644.00 as disturbance compensation pursuant to the
On
On
Meanwhile, on motion of private respondents Carloses, the DARAB issued a Writ of Possession[12]
dated
On 26 December 1990, petitioners Berbosos
filed an Action for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Damages, and Injunction[13]
against private respondents Carloses before the
DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. 217-Bul ’90, alleging therein
that the enforcement of the said Writ of Possession would unjustly deprive them
of possession of their land since the land being tilled and tenanted by their
brother Emiliano Berboso is
separate and distinct from the land they are tenanting from private respondents
Carloses, and that they have their own tenanted areas
of cultivation which are separate and distinct from that of their brother Emiliano Berboso.
Upon motion of
private respondents Carloses, the DARAB issued on
On P1,000,000.00 as redemption money. DARAB Case No. 368-Bul ‘92 was
consolidated with DARAB Case No. 217-Bul ‘90.
On
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition and the motion to remand the same to the DARAB are hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the motion for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the decision is likewise denied and
DARAB Case No. 101-Bul ’89 is hereby remanded to the public respondent for
further proceedings.
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the
above-mentioned cases for lack of basis and/or for being moot and academic;
2. Ordering the plaintiffs/petitioners
[petitioner Berbosos] to vacate and restore to the
defendants’ JKM INTERNATIONAL INC. [private respondent JKM] the portion being
in their present possession; and
3. All other claims are hereby dismissed
likewise, for lack of any legal and factual basis.
Petitioners Berbosos
appealed the aforesaid Decision to the DARAB Head Office at
On
WHEREFORE, Order is hereby issued granting
the Petition and the Order dated
Private
respondents
On 24 October 1994, petitioners Berbosos filed before the DARAB Head Office, Quezon City, a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Complaint for Redemption in DARAB Case No. 368-Bul ’92, since there was no more need for resolution of the said case in light of the Order of DAR Secretary Garilao dated 5 January1994 finding the subject lands to be still agricultural in use and tenanted by petitioners Berbosos.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform dated
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeal and AFFIRMING IN TOTO the challenged decision of the
Adjudicator a quo. Any emancipation patent/s issued in favor of
On
On
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these
consolidated cases are hereby DISMISSED and the appealed decisions of the
Office of the President and the DARAB are hereby AFFIRMED. Additionally, an
order is hereby issued directing the Registry of Deeds, Meycauayan
Branch, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. EP-149-M
and EP-150-M and to reinstate cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-114000 (M), 120510 (M), 102513 (M), 120514 (M), 120516 (M),
and 120517 (M) in the name of respondent JKM IN
Undaunted, petitioners Berbosos filed the instant Petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN INVALIDATING THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLES OF THE PETITIONER BERBOSOS
IN THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT ATTACK;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONVERSION ORDER OF DAR SECRETARY ESTRELLA
DATED
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CARLOSESS HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVERSION OF THEIR LAND UNDER SEC. 36 OF RA 3844;
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS IN APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE
OF ORDER OF CONVERSION;
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF PETITIONER
BERBOSOS AS FARMER-BENEFICIARIES.
Petitioners Berbosos invoked Presidential Decree No. 27.[27]
They argued that, upon the promulgation
of Presidential Decree No. 27 on
Petitioners Berbosos’ arguments are without merit.
Presidential Decree No. 27, or more popularly known as the Emancipation Decree, was signed into law in view of the fact that the old concept of land ownership by a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to violent conflict and tension. The law points out that reformation must start with the emancipation of the tiller from the bondage of the soil.[28] It recognized the importance of encouraging a more productive agricultural base of the nation’s economy. In order to achieve this objective, the decree laid down a scheme for the purchase by small farmers of the lands they were tilling. Landowners of agricultural lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production and exceeded the minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell, through the intercession of the government, their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions.[29]
Presidential Decree No. 27 does not, however, automatically vest ownership of a piece of land to a tenant farmer. The law itself provides for certain conditions and procedures before a qualified farmer can claim the right of absolute ownership over these lands, some of which are as follows:
The total cost of the land, including interest at the
rate of six (6) per centum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant
in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations;
x x x x
No title to the land owned by the tenant-farmers under
this Decree shall be actually issued to a tenant farmer unless and until the
tenant-farmer has become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmer’s
cooperative;
Title to land acquired pursuant to
this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be
transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance
with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other
existing laws and regulations.
Under
Presidential Decree No. 266[30]
which provides for the mechanics of registration of ownership and/or title to
land under Presidential Decree No. 27, full compliance by the grantee with the aforequoted undertakings is required for a grant of title
under Presidential Decree No. 27 and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation
patent in favor of the farmer/grantee. In the case of Pagtalunan
v. Tamayo,[31]
this Court ruled that:
[T]he mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer
does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein.
The certificate simply evidences governments
recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as
provided under PD 27. Neither is this recognition permanent or irrevocable.
Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay
his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of
two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor
is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer [Section 2,
Presidential Decree No. 816 ].
Clearly, it is
only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation
patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the
landholding – a right which has become fixed and established, and is no longer
open to to doubt or controversy [ See definition of
“vested right” or “vested interest” in Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928); Republic of the Philippines
vs. De Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987, 151
SCRA 88 ]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these conditions, merely
possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.” [32]
In the case at bar, petitioners Berbosos submitted as evidence TCTs No. EP-149-M and No. EP-150-M,[33] issued by the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in their favor, to prove their claim of ownership over the subject lands. However, the manner by which petitioners Berbosos acquired such TCTs is highly irregular, which casts doubt on their validity.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266 provides that:
If the land is previously registered under the Torrens System, the Emancipation Patent and/or Grant, if filed with the Register of Deeds, shall constitute conclusive authority for him to enter a transfer certificate of title in accordance with such patent and/or grant: Provided, however, That the Register of Deeds, before cancelling the original of the certificate of title and issuing a new one in favor of the grantee, shall require the registered owner or the party in possession thereof to surrender for cancellation the owner’s duplicate within a reasonable period; and Provided, further, That if the owner or party withholding such duplicate certificate shall refuse or fail to surrender the same within thirty (30) days from and after the date of receipt of the proper notice, the Register of Deeds shall be authorized to cancel the original as well as the owner’s duplicate certificate of title and issue in lieu thereof a new one, with the corresponding owner’s duplicate, in favor of the grantee.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records which shows that the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, had required private respondent JKM, as the registered owner thereof, to surrender its titles for cancellation and for the issuance of new titles in favor of petitioners Berbosos. There was no proper notice at all given by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to private respondent JKM as regards the cancellation of its titles and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners Berbosos. Indeed, the above-quoted provision was not observed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that:
[I]t appears from the
Manifestation filed by respondent JKM IN
As to the issue of whether or not there was a direct attack on the validity of the TCTs No. EP-149-M and No. EP-150-M of the petitioners Berbosos by private respondents Carloses and JKM thus allowing for the cancellation of said titles, we rule in the affirmative.
In the case of Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo,[35] we had an occasion to discuss the issue of direct attack on the validity of titles, to wit:
A torrens title, as a rule, is
conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding
from this,
It can be recalled that DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order[36]
dated
On 2 February 1994, private respondents Carloses
filed a Motion[38]
for Reconsideration to Set Aside the Order dated 5 January 1994 contending that
they were denied due process since they were not notified of the filing of such
a Petition, and that they were denied the opportunity to present their
evidence. On 28 January 1994, private
respondent JKM likewise filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order dated 5 January
1994[39]
alleging that petitioners Berbosos were duly notified
of the 22 January 1975 Conversion Order. Furthermore, on
There is no doubt from the foregoing that private
respondents Carloses and JKM have attacked and
challenged the
Petitioners Berbosos also contended that since
private respondents Carloses were no longer owners of
the subject land as of
Again, this contention is bereft of any merit.
After the Order dated 22 January 1975 was issued by then DAR Secretary Estrella, what the original tenant therein, Macario Berboso, or his successors-in-interest, Emiliano Berboso and petitioners Berbosos, should have done was to assail the said Order by filing an appeal with the Office of the President within 30 days from their receipt of the said Order pursuant to O.P. Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987,[44] or by filing a Petition for Review within 15 days from notice of the said Order with the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in the case of Villorente v. Aplaya Laiya Corporation,[45] to wit:
Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that final orders of quasi-judicial
bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, including the DAR
under Republic Act No. 6657, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review. Under Section 4 of the Rule, the petition should be filed
within 15 days from notice of the said final order or from the date of its last
publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration duly filed in accordance
with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo.
Unfortunately,
they did not question the Conversion Order dated P112,644.00, Emiliano Berboso and petitioners Berbosos contested the lawfulness of the said amount by
filing a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. It was only on 9 December 1992, or after 17
years from the issuance of the
Moreover, the 26 March 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lawfulness of the disturbance compensation awarded by the 18 December 1989 DARAB Decision, is final and binding upon the petitioners Berbosos.
It can be recalled that Emiliano Berboso filed a Petition for Review[49] of the DARAB Decision dated 18 December 1989 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, questioning therein the lawfulness of the amount of disturbance compensation awarded to him and claiming that his brother and sister, herein petitioners Berbosos, should have been included as parties in the Joint Motion for Determination of Disturbance Compensation since they are also tenants of the subject land.
On
At this point,
the proper remedy of Emiliano Berboso
under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court would be to file a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals of its 26 March 1992
Decision within 15 days from notice thereof, or an Appeal by Certiorari with this Court within 15
days from notice of the assailed Decision pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. However,
after going through the records of the instant Petition, we find no evidence
showing that Emiliano Berboso
had indeed filed the said Motion or Appeal. Hence, under Section 2 of Rule 36 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the
It is well-settled that a judgment which had acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, thus, may no longer be modified in any respect except to clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.[51] Since the lawfulness of the determination of the award of disturbance compensation was already settled in the 26 March 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, we hold that the legality and validity of the 22 January 1975 Conversion Order is also settled because determination of disturbance compensation necessarily follows the Conversion Order. Simply put, there would be no determination of disturbance compensation without a Conversion Order being first validly issued.
It may be
argued that the
It is true that Emiliano Berboso is the sole petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147. Nevertheless, the 26 March 1992 Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in the said case is also binding upon the other petitioners Berbosos because although they were not the original parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, they were duly represented by their brother Emiliano Berboso, who was named a party merely in representation of their deceased father, Macario Berboso, the tenant beneficiary at the time the Conversion Order was issued on 22 January 1975. It should be emphasized that Emiliano Berboso and his siblings merely inherited and acquired the tenancy rights of their father, Macario Berboso. Petitioners Berbosos failed to establish that they had tenancy rights separate and distinct from what their brother Emiliano Berboso acquired from their father, Macario Berboso.
Petitioners Berbosos further alleged that private respondents Carloses failed to comply with the requirements stated in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844 as regards the conversion of the subject land; that private respondents Carloses did not, within one year from dispossession of their tenants, undertake the conversion of the subject lands from agricultural to residential, industrial and commercial purposes; and that DAR Secretary Garilao was correct in reversing and setting aside the Conversion Order issued by the previous DAR Secretary Estrella.
Since we already ruled that the
The DAR
Secretary’s appealed decision was anchored on the inherent authority of the
Secretary to review the action of his predecessor, and on Sec. X(D) of
Administrative Order No. 15 series of 1989 (Rules Governing Conversion of
Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses), which reads:
“X. The
Secretary may cancel or withdraw authorization for conversion already issued,
for any of the following causes/reasons:
x x
x x
D. Failure to
complete the development of the area within the time frame specified in Section
IV-H above.”
And
Section IV-H provides:
“IV. Governing Principles.
H. To prevent
speculation,
x x x x
Regarding the
invocation of Sections IV and X of Administrative Order No. 15, the inequity of
applying the deadline provided for in the Order is revealed by the following
considerations:
(a)
Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Reform Code
of 1963, was the law existing at the time the application for conversion was
filed and granted. The remedy available
to tenants in the event their landowner fail to develop the property is found
in Sec. 36 (1) thereof which reads:
“Sec. 36. Possession of Landholdings;
Exceptions.- x x x
(1) x x x Provided, further, That
should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession
of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss
incurred by him because of said dispossession.”
From the foregoing, it is clear that the one year period
commences to run only after the tenant has been dispossessed of the property. Since at no time were the Berbosos
evicted from the property, the one year period deadline did not commence to
run. Also, most significant is the fact that the remedy available to the
dispossessed tenant is the right to demand possession of the land plus recovery
of damages, and not the cancellation of the order of conversion.
(b) While Administrative Order No. 15 applies to the petition for conversion filed in 1989, Sections IV-H and X-D thereof provide that the one year period commences to run only after the issuance of the development permit by the HLURB. The developer, JKM International Inc., claimed that no permit has yet been issued by the said agency. In view of the non-issuance, the one year deadline could not have operated against the rights of the appellants.[52]
This finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
Well-settled is the rule that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined only to specific matters, is accorded not only respect but finality, particularly when affirmed by the appellate tribunal.[53]
Petitioners Berbosos further claimed they were denied due process in the application, issuance and confirmation of the said Conversion Order.
This is not so.
When private respondents Carloses applied for the issuance of the Conversion Order with the DAR in 1973, one of the original tenants in the subject land was petitioners Berbosos’ father, Macario Berboso. While the said application is still pending with the DAR, all tenants of private respondents Carloses, including Macario Berboso, were notified and interviewed by DAR Officer Guillermo V. Sta. Ana as regards the said application.[54] All of the said tenants, including Macario Berboso, made written declarations and manifestations with regard to the said application.[55] Despite said notices, Macario Berboso did not initiate any proceedings to contest the processing of the application and the subsequent issuance of the Conversion Order.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioners Berbosos were not notified of the application for Conversion Order filed by private respondents Carloses, this lack of notice had been cured[56] when they actively intervened and participated in the proceedings before the DARAB, the PARAB, the Office of the President, and the Court of Appeals. The petitioners Berbosos made appeals and had also repeatedly moved for the reconsideration of each decision that was adverse to them. Time and again, we ruled that what is repugnant to due process is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.[57] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[58] Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[59]
Lastly, petitioners Berbosos also posited that their security of tenure as
farmers-beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 was violated. According
to them, the
It was already ruled in the Court of Appeals Decision of 26 March 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147 that petitioners Berbosos were duly represented therein by their brother Emiliano Berboso, who was named a party in representation of their father, Macario Berboso, the tenant beneficiary at the time the 22 January 1975 Conversion Order was issued, and that the disturbance compensation awarded to Emiliano Berboso necessarily includes the disturbance compensation due to petitioners Berbosos. As we discussed earlier, this Decision is already final and binding upon petitioners Berbosos. Hence, there is no more need to determine the claim of security of tenure by petitioners Berbosos as farmers-beneficiaries.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
Costs against petitioners.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII, Section
13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Andres B. Reyes, concurring; Rollo, pp. 33-46.
[2] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 295-306.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] “AN ACT TO O
[17] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 263-271.
[18]
[19]
[20] CA rollo ( CA G.R. SP No. 41568 ), pp. 110-120.
[21] CA rollo (CA G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 288-294.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Rollo, pp. 33-46.
[27] “DECREEING
THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS
FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND
THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR.” (
[28] Torres v.
[29] Pagtalunan
v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281,
[30] “PROVIDING FOR THE MECHANICS OF
REGISTRATION OF OWNERSHIP AND/OR TITLE TO LAND UNDER PD NO. 27.” (
[31] Supra note 29.
[32] Supra note 27.
[33] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 337-340.
[34] Rollo, p. 45.
[35] 389 Phil. 153, 165 (2000).
[36] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 272-277.
[37]
[38] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 41568), pp. 147-151.
[39]
[40]
[41] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 278-287.
[42]
[43]
[44] Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1999 (
[45] G.R. No. 145013,
[46] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 272-277.
[47] Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962, 970-971.
[48] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 322-327.
[49]
[50]
[51] Ram’s Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 542, 550 (2000).
[52] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 290-294.
[53] Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 656, 674 (1997).
[54] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 42122), pp. 203-204.
[55]
[56] German Management and Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, 14 September 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 500; Marvel Building Corp. v. Ople, 207 Phil. 351, 353 (1983); Ablaza v. Court of Industrial Relations, 211 Phil. 425, 432 (1983); Cruz v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 56591, 17 January 1983, 120 SCRA 15, 21; Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 502.
[57] Capuno v. Jaramillo, A.M. No. RTJ-93-944,
[58] Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Abille, G.R. No. 130196,
[59] Roxas v. Vasquez, 411 Phil. 276, 287 (2001).